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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to bring reasoning and evidence from 
both mainstream economics and from behavioral economics in an attempt 
to understand why people would use donor advised funds as a financial ve-
hicle for their charitable giving and what are the effects of doing so. Clearly 
there are some simple benefits, such as budgeting convenience, smoothing 
consumption and giving over time, and the involvement of family in the 
charitable decision making. These are all well documented by the 2015 Giv-
ing Report from Fidelity Charitable. 
While these benefits are laudable, they do not seem consequential 
enough to account for the huge rise in use of DAFs in recent years. We will 
use standard economic logic as well as the responses to the survey given by 
Fidelity Charitable to its account holders and recounted in their 2015 giving 
report to inform our analysis. 
It is important to note, while I apply well-established economic results 
and tools of analysis in this document, what I do not do is look directly at 
any data about DAF holders: their other financial holdings, their wealth, 
their ages, education, or domestic situations. I do not know how much 
wealth they have or how they attained it, and I do not know how they had 
planned to spend that wealth before the popularization of DAFs. I don’t use 
this because such data is not available to researchers. Because of the reports 
from survey conducted by Fidelity of its donors, I am able to glean suffi-
cient important information to form the hypotheses used in my analysis. 
I have organized my paper into two main parts. Part I takes a sober 
look at DAFs as public policy, from the point of view of a dispassionate 
neoclassical economist. It raises some questions about DAFs that the neo-
classical economist would find puzzling. We then go to Part II where a 
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more modern behavioral economist takes over. In this section I attempt to 
use models and findings about how people actually think, as opposed to 
how a purely rational person is supposed to think, to explore further the in-
triguing behavior of DAF holders. 
The paper ends with a conclusion that summarizes what we know, 
acknowledges what we must conjecture, and describes the steps we must 
take to understand the public policy implications for DAFs and to determine 
their social value as financial vehicle for charitable giving.   
PART I. THE ECONOMICS OF CHARITABLE GIVING 
A. Charitable Giving as a Social Investment 
A familiar and important concept in financial investing is the return on 
investment or ROI. Financial ROI is easy to measure—it is all in terms of 
dollars, and it is easy to track. On statements from brokerages there is usu-
ally some calculation labeled, for instance, “your personal rate of return.” 
Since gains are compounded, a $100 investment with an annual ROI of 6% 
will in ten years be worth $216. 
Contributions to a charity can be thought of as investments as well. 
Some of these have been studied and quantified just as financial invest-
ments have. If, for instance, a donation allows an underprivileged student to 
attend college, we know the ROI for a college degree is, on average, about 
15%. Other charities have done the work to uncover their own ROI. For 
instance, GiveDirectly gives $2000 cash grants to the poorest households in 
Kenya and did a randomized field test to learn what recipients of their 
grants did. They most often invested in replacing the grass roof on their huts 
with a tin roof and thus saving $400 per year in roof-maintenance, making it 
an investment that yields about a 20% return. But the value of other charita-
ble services are difficult to quantify, such as a safe house for an abused 
woman, the granting of human rights to the oppressed, or freeing someone 
from death row by demonstrating an incorrect conviction. Turning these 
into a “dollars equivalent” ROI requires assumptions that only the donor 
can make—what is the value of a person’s life, or dignity, or freedom? 
Like financial investing, charitable investing also often has compound-
ing returns, and this compounding can be far more rapid than in financial 
investing. For example, every time someone is vaccinated that person is 
protected, but the protections provided to those not vaccinated increase as 
well. When vaccines saturate society to a sufficient degree (called the herd 
immunity threshold), often around 85-90%, virtually the whole population 
is protected. Or think of our college graduate in the example above. It is 
well known that the children of college graduates are far more likely to go 
to college. Thus creating one extra college graduate means that his 2.4 chil-
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dren are likely to become college graduates, as are his 4.8 grandchildren, 
and so on, and through time the growth is exponential. Or the Kenyan with 
who saves $400 per year may now have a healthier and more productive 
family, again sending positive ripple through time. 
These investments have the property that the more any one person in-
vests, the greater the ROI to each dollar invested by everyone. We call this 
phenomenon increasing returns. The idea is illustrated in Figure 1. An ex-
ample of an increasing returns charitable investment might be a project to 
build a new Economics building to UCSD. There is a minimum amount of 
money it takes to even break ground on the building, say $5 million. Before 
this, a small donation produces no building. After the first $5 million, then 
as more dollars come in the building can be larger, equipped with more and 
better classrooms, until the ROI on the Charitable investment exceeds the 
ROI on financial investment. Before reaching this point, a donor looking at 
the ROI on private investing and the ROI on charitable investing would find 
a gift a bad deal. But if the charity can somehow get total donations to the 
point that ROI surpasses that of private investing (B, in Figure 1), then the 
fund drive can be a success. 
This concept of increasing returns to charitable investing has been 
studied extensively in economics and is one of the most robust features of 
giving. For instance, it explains one of the common rules of thumb for char-
itable campaign drives—line up donations of about one third of your goal 
ahead of announcing the campaign. The pre-arranged donations, often 
called “seed gifts,” assure that the charitable ROI rises above the financial 
ROI at the start of the fund drive, thus guaranteeing its success.1 
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Figure 1.  Making Charitable Investments.  
Charitable giving is often characterized by increasing returns. This means that the 
Return on Investment is higher for all investors as the fund grows. When the ROI is 
below the financial ROI, donors are reluctant to give and a good cause can get 
“stuck a 0” (A). If donors, or perhaps a single lead donor, can invest enough so that 
the ROI exceeds the financial ROI, then donors can invest (B). As long as the chari-
table ROI exceeds the financial ROI, it is socially better to invest in the charity (C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When looking at charitable giving in terms of investing rather than 
simply spending money, one can appreciate that the concept of return-on-
investment is key to giving wisely. Today there is a concerted effort by 
many charities, charity advisors, and charity recommenders to quantify the 
“impact” of a charity.2 While there may be no way to quantify the social 
returns of many of these charities (although some are trying) the hope is 
that by describing the impact, donors themselves can decide whether the 
impact of a charity adds up to an ROI that justifies a gift 
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ratings by GiveWell. The Center for Effective Philanthropy, with funding from The Hewlett 
Foundation, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and others is devoted to helping charities measure 
and demonstrate their impacts. 
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Those investing in DAFs may be no different, and appear to have po-
tentially more information on charitable impact since one of the services 
that accompany DAFs is advice on effective giving. In the Fidelity Charita-
ble did survey, 43% of DAF holders reported relying on Fidelity for advice 
on the recipients of their donations. 
B. Are Tax Savings a Benefit of DAFs or a Cost? 
The web pages of organizations offering DAFs often tout the tax sav-
ings the donor will receive as a benefit. While it is a benefit to the person 
receiving the tax savings, it is important to keep in mind that it is a cost to 
society.  
The argument is akin to legislators who say that the benefit of a public 
works project, like building a new bridge, is that it will create jobs. In fact 
the benefit is that people will be able to use the bridge. The cost can be 
measured by, in part, how many people the government needs to hire to 
build the bridge. That is, those jobs are not the benefit of the government 
spending, but the cost. To be sure, those who get the jobs will benefit as 
individuals, but from a social point of view, if we can get the same bridge 
and create fewer jobs, then we have a more efficiently built bridge and soci-
ety is better off. 
Let’s look at the statement that reduced tax payments to the govern-
ment are a benefit. What is the objective of a DAF from the point of view of 
the society in general? It must be to increase the level and impact of chari-
table giving in the US—this is like building the bridge. What is the cost? 
That the government will lose tax dollars in the process. Those tax dollars 
could then be used to reduce the federal deficit. Then the public policy 
question becomes, does the tax policy toward DAFs create more benefits in 
terms of growth in charitable giving to justify the loss in tax revenue? 
Next we will look at the consequences for DAFs on the finances of 
those who give, and use current research to conjecture on how the policy 
influences giving. 
 
C. Evaluating Costs and Benefits for Policy 
The concepts about how policy makers evaluate the costs and benefits 
of a policy are perhaps best illustrated by analogy to an example that is sim-
ilar to, but simpler than, DAFs.   
Imagine a firm wants to encourage its employees to exercise.  They of-
fer a free membership to the gym at a nearby gym, and pay employees $25 
per each week that they use the gym at least once.  Usage of the gym is ex-
traordinary.  Is the business making a good investment?  Consider three 
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types of employees. Employee A never worked out before and now uses the 
gym once a week.  Clearly both the gym and the subsidy have encouraged 
this person.  Employee B was a member of a gym already, but only went 
once a month.  Now he goes 3 times a month.  The free gym membership 
has no effect on this person, but the subsidy is paying off for the company.   
Finally employee C already went to the same gym 3 times a week, and now 
with the policy gets a free membership and $100 a month, but does no extra 
workouts.    
Economists would say that for Employee A, both the gym and the sub-
sidy provided marginal incentives.  That is, both policies changed A’s be-
havior.   For B, the subsidy had marginal incentives; the $75 encouraged 2 
additional visits.  However, the effects of the free membership were all in-
fra-marginal; the free membership was a waste of money, but the weekly 
subsidy paid off.  Employee C’s exercise regimen was affected neither the 
membership nor the subsidy, so the incentives are all infra-marginal: C got 
a free membership and $100 a month all for doing what he would have done 
anyway.  So whether the impact of this program are worth the cost depends 
on the number of people like A, B, and C in the company.  
 How does this apply to DAFs?  When evaluating a policy, the gov-
ernment weighs the benefits against the cost.   One of the costs to DAFs are 
the lost tax revenues caused by the existence of DAFs.   The benefits of 
DAFs are the potential increase in donations caused by the existence of 
DAFs. The important clause in the last two sentences is “caused by the ex-
istence of DAFs.”  That is, if there are marginal effects on either the taxes 
paid or the donations made, then we want to count these as part of the social 
costs or social benefits.   But if people pay the same tax or give the same 
amount that they would without the DAF—even if money flows through a 
DAF—then we don’t want to count the tax saving or the giving as part of 
the costs or benefits.   We only want to count as costs the marginal (i.e. 
new) tax savings caused by the DAF, and the marginal (i.e. new) charitable 
giving caused by the DAF.      
Suppose the investors using DAFs to save taxes are savvy enough to 
have found other ways to save those tax dollars had they not been able to do 
so with a DAF.  Then this tax cost would be zero for those donors.  That is, 
the DAF did not cause a change in tax savings.  Only if the DAFs open new 
opportunities for tax savings will those be counted as costs.  
The same is true on the side of donations.  If the DAF just allows peo-
ple to give what they always planned to give, but just in a different form, 
then these donations from the DAF do not count as benefits.  If DAFs end 
up encouraging new donations that otherwise would not have been given, 
then this new generosity is what we need to count as the benefit to society.  
 James Andreoni 41 
Clearly there are other costs and benefits to DAFs that are also im-
portant to families and to charities.  These are not to be ignored.  For this 
piece, however, we will focus on the main elements of costs and benefits, 
tax avoidance and new donations.  
C. How does DAFs Affect Personal Finances? 
A DAF is like a savings and investing account that is restricted only to 
be spent on charitable giving.  How does this restriction affect personal and 
charitable investments? Answering this question will be easiest if we work 
from an example. Table 1 is based off of an example provided by Fidelity 
Charitable on their web page.3 We will work through this table in this sec-
tion as part of our attempt to understand the financial consequences of 
DAFs for the economy in general. 
Consider an individual who has an account that today is worth 100, 
where you may think of this as anywhere from $100 to $100,000 to $100 
million. The assets in this account are earmarked to be given away in 10 
years, at whatever value they have then. We can ask how this decision is 
affected by the availability of a DAF. 
Example 1: Suppose the assets are in an account that regularly gets 
taxable income or dividends. Then this person would be wise to put the 100 
in a DAF and allow it to accumulate these proceeds without tax.  Realisti-
cally, the fact that the tax system favors capital gains means that most secu-
rities are designed to produce capital gains rather than income. For instance, 
looking at some of the most popular blue chip mutual funds offered by Fi-
delity, the average fund would generate a tax bill each year that is less than 
1% of the price of the security. Thus, while the gain from avoiding this is 
real and is easily enough to justify using a DAF, this is unlikely to tip the 
scale one way or the other on policy questions surrounding DAFs. 
Example 2: Suppose the funds designated for the charity are in assets 
that have accrued substantial long term capital gains, and that pay no taxa-
ble dividends. Thus one of the tax consequences is that one can gain the 
income tax deduction for the current amount now by giving the money to 
the DAF rather than waiting 10 years. But is this desirable? Table 1 shows 
an example of a person who has an account that is yielding long term capi-
tal gains, which are only taxable on realization, to use to fund her DAF. We 
want to compare scenario B, where the person sets up a DAF, to scenario C 
                                                                                                                           
 3  Go to http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-account/features/tax-benefits.shtml, and 
follow the link “view hypothetical example”.  This example is of a $100,000 sale of appreciated 
stock, with a basis of $40,000, a capital gain of $60,000, a marginal tax rate of 35% and a capital 
gains rate of 15%.  The example shows how giving this asset to a DAF would say $35,000 in 
income taxes and $9000 in capital gains tax. This is shown in Panel 2, the first column labeled 
Give Today. 
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where she does not. In both cases the money is distributed to the charity in 
10 years and thus the charity gets the same donation. The assumption in B 
is that the tax savings are immediately reinvested in the same asset, and 
then liquidated in 10 years, with a capital gain. In C the assumption is that 
the tax savings are realized in 10 years as cash. As the Table shows, there 
are there is a $4 advantage to not setting up a DAF (Comparison 1 versus 
2). The reason is that the tax savings today of $35 on federal income tax in 
scenario B sets up a basis for a capital gain when it is liquidated in 10 years 
with taxes paid. If instead the donor holds the money herself, the charity 
received the same donation and no capital gains tax is ever paid. 
Example 3: Moving to scenario D, we see that DAFs seem financially 
advantageous almost exclusively to those who anticipate a realization of 
capital gains before the time in which they are ready to give away the entire 
value of that asset (Table 1, Comparisons 3 and 4). Someone who must real-
ize the gain would otherwise pay a tax of 15%, or $9. To justify setting up 
the DAF, this person must be willing to give away the DAF balance in their 
lifetimes, or in the lifetimes of their heirs. For example, one of the biggest 
recipients of DAF contribution from Fidelity Charitable is the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The money set aside in the DAF can be 
used for the family’s annual donation to the Mormon Church, and if the 
owner dies before the DAF is fully liquidated, her heirs can continue using 
the DAF for the same purpose. In this way, we now see the value of a chari-
table savings account. A need or desire to sell a security with substantial 
capital can create an opportunity to use a DAF for considerable tax savings. 
The fact that avoiding capital gains tax is the primary financial ad-
vantage to DAFs is borne out by the Fidelity Charitable survey of their cli-
ents. 78% donors list that their reason for setting up a DAF was “to poten-
tially limit capital gains taxes.” 
The Fidelity Charitable web page seems to recognize this as well. 
Their hypothetical example, which is the basis for Table 1, is the only ex-
ample given for how the tax savings can accrue. They, correctly, do not list 
collection of the income tax deduction immediately as a financial benefit, as 
Table 1 demonstrates that this can create a financial loss. (Other DAF pro-
viders, however, make this mistake.) 
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Assumptions: Value of Stock 100                      
Capital Gain 60                        
Return on Investment: 
6%
8%
Tax Rates:
15%
35.0%
Giving Scenarios: A. Give Today B. Give thru a DAF C. Save unrealized D. Save realized
Give Today without a DAF in 10 years gain outside DAF gain outside DAF
Present Value Future Value Future Value Future Value Future Value
at time of Gift in 10 years in 10 years in 10 Years in 10 Years
Charitable Investment: $100 $216 $179 $179 $163
Federal Tax Savings†‡  
Capital Gains Tax $9 $12 $12 $16 -$8
Income Tax $35 $63 $63 $63 $57
Total $44 $75 $75 $79 $49
Comparison 1 Comparison 2. Comparison 3. Comparison 4
FV of Give Today FV of Give Today
vs Give w/ DAF Assuming Assuming vs Give w/o DAF
in 10 years Unrealized Gain Realized Gain in 10 years
today today after Realized Gain
A - B B - C B - D A - D
Net Benefits to: 
Charitable Investment $37 $0 $16 $53
$0 -$4 $26 $26   Donor's Federal  Tax Savings†
† it is also common for state taxes to allow  for a deduction of charitable contributions from state taxable income. In California, for example, one could
   expect an additional 10.3% to 13.3% savings in state tax
‡ The tax savings in the f irst column include $9 of avoided capital gains tax, that is, the comparison is made to an individual w ho w ould otherw ise have 
   liquidated the asset for personal use. 
Table 1:  Why Do People Need a Charitable Savings Account?
Future Value of a plan to give all of the appreciated stock to charity in 10 years vs today under different scenarios. The greatest
gain is to Give Today without a DAF (A), and the Strongest Incentive to do so is if the alternative is no DAF as well.   The most 
convenient alternative for the Donor is (B) which costs the charity 17% of the value of the gift, but gains nothing for the donor. 
Income
Give in10 yrsThru DAF versus Private Saving
Panel 1: Assumptions 
Panel 2: Giving Scenarios
Panel 3: Net Benefits to Society and to Donors
Financial
Charitable
Capital Gains
 
D. Does the Existence of a DAF Make People More Generous? 
To make thing simple, suppose that our donors is facing the choice of 
giving away the $100 asset discussed in Table 1, or liquidating the asset to 
use for personal expenses. 
Example 4: Suppose the individual had considered making a donation 
of the assets now worth $100 and had decided not to. The investment is in a 
single asset which she has no intention of trading or realizing any gains for 
the coming 10 years. The introduction of DAFs has absolutely no conse-
quence for this person. Neither the charity nor the donor can benefit. 
Example 5. Suppose instead that the donor planned to leave the money 
for the charity in her will. Again, she had considered giving it earlier, but 
decided against it. The DAF is, again, inconsequential. 
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Example 6. The donor had decided to give the fund, and decided that 
giving it in 10 years most suited her. The DAF is equivalent to holding the 
asset herself, except that by realizing the income tax savings now, she sets 
up a basis for a capital gains tax when she liquidates in 10 years, which as 
we see in comparison 2 of Table 1 makes her worse off. This person has no 
use for a DAF. 
So far, as long as the investor has money in a financial instrument that 
allows for delay of any realized gains until the asset is sold, we have no fi-
nancial reason to favor a DAF. Therefore, to prefer a DAF, it must also be 
that one would prefer to trade the asset they are giving away. 
Example 5: Suppose our donor was an early investor in Company X 
and would like to diversify by selling some shares in Company X.  She is 
held back by the sizable capital gain tax that would result. The donor realiz-
es that throughout her remaining life, and the lives of her heirs, she will 
give at least $100, in present value terms, to charity. If she donates the stock 
today to an irrevocable DAF she can save the large capital gain and satisfy 
her lifetime giving goals, and perhaps those of her children. She now has 
use for a DAF. 
Example 6: Instead, suppose our donor is happy to hold on to her in-
vestment in Company X, but because of a sale, is being forced to liquidate 
and realize those capital gains. In anticipation of this the donor can open a 
DAF to shield herself from the tax on capital gains. If the $100 in wealth 
represents the present value of all of the lifetime donations that this person 
would ever plan to make, then the person can benefit from a savings ac-
count for charitable giving. 
Example 7: A donor holds some highly illiquid asset, such as stock in a 
privately held company. The individual would like to sell the stock, but be-
cause it does not publicly trade, it is difficult to arrange a buyer and agree 
on a fair market price. In their 2015 report, Fidelity Charitable states that 
the company, “Has expertise in converting non-publicly traded assets into 
charitable dollars and has seen substantial growth in these types of contribu-
tions in recent years. Since inception, Fidelity Charitable has assisted in 
converting $2.4 billion of illiquid assets into charitable dollars available for 
grants.”  Depending the valuation provided by Fidelity in this service, set-
ting up DAF could be superior to other methods of realizing the gain, but 
only if the donor had already planned to give away an amount that, over her 
lifetime, would result in an equivalent change in her private investment ac-
counts.  Since appreciated assets are difficult to value, it is unclear from the 
Fidelity report how much of this $2.4 billion dollars in assets eventually 
became available for the charity, what the tax cost to the government would 
be, and what the alternatives a DAF would have  produced for the investor.  
This seems like an important and growing role that DAFs are playing, and 
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more data from the financial institutions that convert these illiquid assets 
would be extremely helpful in understanding how they are making a differ-
ence to charities and donors alike.  
E. Who Benefits Financially From DAFs? 
The examples above illustrate two things.  First, for people without 
appreciated stock to use to establish a DAF, most of the financial benefits of 
a DAF can be reproduced with other financial instruments, as long as inves-
tors choose securities that pay little or no taxable distributions.   The bene-
fits of avoiding these taxes on distributions are real, and if a donor wishes to 
hold a DAF for many years, the gains will indeed add up.  Furthermore, if 
the donor devotes all of these savings to charity (realistically, about 1% per 
year), then the additional giving would exactly offset the tax savings, that is, 
benefit equals cost and the policy conclusion is neutral.   
The second thing the examples show is that there can be considerable 
tax savings by a donor that satisfies these three criteria: 1) has shares of 
stock with substantial capital gains, 2) would like to sell the stock, and 3) 
has already decided that over her lifetime (and those of their heirs) she will 
give away at least the amount of wealth that is represented by this current 
market value of this stock. 
Those who satisfy these 3 conditions are in a position to reach their 
giving goals at a substantial saving of taxes. It is important to note that for 
these people in these examples, the saved taxes are a pure windfall—they 
had been planning to give at least $100 over their remaining life anyway, so 
the tax benefit is fully “infra-marginal,” that is they don’t have to change 
their behavior at all in order to gain the full tax benefit. So what happens to 
the saved tax dollars?  How much of it will go to charity, and how much 
will be kept by the donor? While we know a fair amount about how annual 
giving responds to the tax deduction on income taxes, less is known about 
the effects of the forgiveness of capital gains taxes or about people with in-
comes in the reaches of those most likely to have such gains.4  Based on the 
estimates we do  have, it is believed that individuals who have the means to 
save substantial sums in capital gains, most likely someone well above the 
top 1% of income and wealth, gives away about 2% to 6% of annual in-
come.  Keeping with the example in Table 1, adopting the most favorable 
estimate, the loss of tax revenue to the treasury today of $9 would on aver-
                                                                                                                           
4
 For the most relevant results on high income tax payers, see Gerald E. Auten, Charles T. 
Clotfelter and Richard L. Schmalbeck. “Taxes and philanthropy among the wealthy.” In 
J.Slemrod, ed., Does atlas shrug (2000): 392-424. 
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age result in an estimated 6% of this this $9, or $0.54, in present value of 
extra charity.  
As with our example of the gym membership, there now remains a 
third type of person.  Suppose this person had made a plan to give $40 to 
charity over her lifetime, not the $100 full value of the asset.  Surely she 
will open a DAF worth 40, saving capital gains tax of 3.6.  But if she puts 
more in the DAF she will save more tax.  Now there is a marginal incentive 
to give away more—by changing her intended behavior she can save more 
tax.  Suppose we adopt the most optimistic assumption, that is, the addi-
tional tax saving encourages her to give all 100 to the DAF.  The $60 of 
new donations that are caused by the DAF, but the DAF will now cost the 
full amount of the lost capital gains tax, $9, plus will now cost society an 
extra $30 in income tax revenue.5   This now results in a net benefit from 
the DAF—$60 in new giving at a cost of $39 of tax revenue 
As with the example of the company’s gym subsidies, whether DAFs 
will generate more benefit than cost will depend on the proportions of these 
three types of investors among DAF holders.   Unfortunately, data that 
would be sufficient to learn about the impacts of DAFs changes in intended 
giving an on tax savings are not available to researchers, thus we cannot 
know for sure what the proportions of donors of different types are.    This 
discussion and analysis can be greatly helped by the availability of data 
from providers of DAFs and from surveys from individual DAF holders.  
F. When is the Best Time to Spend a DAF? 
The interesting thing about DAFs is that the money is in an irrevocable 
fund, that is, the money has already been given from the donor, but simply 
has not yet been allocated to the qualified charity. When is the best time to 
give money to the charity? 
From a purely economics point of view, the simple-minded answer is 
to look at the ROI. If a donor has already decided which charity she wants 
to invest in, the return on investment for the charity (given the values of this 
donor) can be assumed to be above that of the market. Considering only 
economic arguments, society as a whole would be getting richer by allocat-
ing money sooner.  In the worst case, if a donor gives all of the money to 
the charity, the charity itself can save and invest the money, which should 
                                                                                                                           
5 The DAF lowers the “price” of giving this extra money from $0.65 cents on the dollar (i.e. 
0.65 = 1 - 0.35) to $0.50 cents on the dollar (i.e. 0.5 = 1 - 0.35 - 0.15).   Our best estimate from the 
literature is that this would not cause the donor to give the remaining $70 to charity, but only in-
crease giving by about 26% or about $10.4 (assuming a price elasticity of 1.1).  Thus our best 
guess, given current data, is that this donor would give an extra $10.4 to charity, and claim a tax 
savings of $25.2.   That is, our best estimate in this example is that the DAF would cause the aver-
age person to increase giving by $10.4 and to claim new tax savings $5.2. 
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not make the donor worse off, but the charity can choose the optimal risk of 
investment and timing of spending, which should make the donor better off. 
Thus, considering only the fundamentals, the sooner the money goes to the 
charity the better. 
An illustration of this is given in Table 1 in in scenario A. Here we as-
sume that the donor gives the money directly to a charity in the year of the 
upcoming realized gain. Because, as we established earlier, a wise charita-
ble investor will donate to organizations offering social rate of return above 
the private rate of return, we assumed for illustration that the ROI is 6% per 
year on financial investing and 8% per year for the charitable investing.6 As 
this shows, the social value of the charitable investment of $100 today will 
grow to $216 in 10 years. If instead that asset were put into a DAF and then 
given in 10 years, the social value of the gift at that time would be only 
$179 (scenario B). Society has a return of $37 more in ten years if the dona-
tion was given directly to the charity (comparison 1). 
Since the returns to society are obviously larger when investments in 
society are made sooner, then why don’t all DAF holders apply this logic?  
The answer is that there must be other reasons beyond the purely economic 
logic just provided that makes the donor, the financial institutions, or the 
charities themselves happier to have DAFs than not.  Going beyond the 
simple rational-economic-thinker paradigm means looking more closely at 
how people really make decisions, not simply how a traditional economist 
assumes they do.  That means that we allow motivations that are psycholog-
ical, social, or are based on a different reasoning than that of a coolly ana-
lytical economist.  
PART II. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF CHARITABLE GIVING 
A. Why Do People Give? 
Why do people give? This question is as old as Aristotle. It has been 
asked by theologians, philosophers, sociologists, evolutionary biologists, 
neuroscientists, and economists. What we’ve learned is that there is no sin-
gle answer, except for this one: Giving is rarely done for purely altruistic 
reasons.7 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Both of these ROIs were selected somewhat arbitrarily by the author, and for the qualitative 
statements here make little difference. The difference in the two rates, however, was chosen to be 
2% since that is approximately the typical management fee for DAFs and represents a minimum 
of surplus return to charity. 
 7 For reviews on the economics literature on philanthropy and charitable giving, see Andre-
oni, “Philanthropy,” Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity 2 (2006) 
1201-1269 (2006); Andreoni & Payne, “Charitable giving,” Handbook of Public Economics 5 
(2013): 1-50. 
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By pure altruism I mean that giving that is done solely for the concern 
of the recipient without any other motives. The moral philosopher Thomas 
Nagel (1978) in his famous book, The Possibility of Altruism, argues in 120 
pages that such pureness of heart is indeed possible, but science has discov-
ered in thousands of studies that no matter how pure or pious one’s heart, 
there are usually ulterior motives. That is not to say, however, that the lack 
of pure altruism automatically makes someone any less generous, moral, or 
good. Rather, science also shows that our natural predisposition is mostly to 
be virtuous, but that we also get a psychological boost from the very act of 
being virtuous.8 Moreover, this disposition toward giving means that social 
institutions can develop rules and customs to bring out altruism in others. 
That is, our ulterior motives provide the behavioral levers that society can 
pull to nudge us into helping one another. 
1. Warm Glow of Giving 
In the social science literatures, these ulterior motives for giving are 
often (somewhat pejoratively) wrapped up in the single term: the warm-
glow of giving.9 By this we mean that “something else” about the act of 
making a gift brings us private benefits that complement our altruistic con-
cerns. The sources of warm-glow are as wide ranging as feeling good about 
one’s self, feeling the admiration of others, seeing your name on a building, 
or reading Crayola colored thank-you notes from school children helped by 
DonorsChoose.org. 
 Warm-glow giving can is useful because it can explain a great deal 
more of individual giving that pure altruism. For example, Figure 2 demon-
strates how warm-glow can explain generosity beyond what standard eco-
                                                                                                                           
 8 See William T. Harbaugh, Ulrich Mayr & Daniel R. Burghart, “Neural responses to taxation 
and voluntary giving reveal motives for charitable donations,” Science 316.5831 (2007) 1622-
1625; Elizabeth W. Dunn, Lara B. Aknin, & Michael I. Norton “Spending money on others pro-
motes happiness,” Science 319.5870 (2008) 1687-1688. Further evidence of a predisposition to-
ward altruism is that people seem to be aware of the fact that this makes them vulnerable to being 
manipulated and exploited. The problem of exploitation is known in economics as the Samaritan’s 
Dilemma (Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, “The rotten-kid theorem meets the Samaritan’s di-
lemma,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1990) 155-165v, with applications to charity by 
Stephen Coate, “Altruism, the Samaritan’s dilemma, and government transfer policy,” The Ameri-
can Economic Review (1995): 46-57). See also James Andreoni, Justin M. Rao & Hannah 
Trachtman, “Avoiding the ask: a field experiment on altruism, empathy, and charitable giving,” 
No. w17648. National Bureau of Economic Research (2011) for a discussion of how people 
choose actions in an attempt to control their environment in order to prevent themselves from 
being manipulated to give. 
 9 James Andreoni, “Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and Ricardian equiv-
alence,” The Journal of Political Economy (1989) 1447-1458; James Andreoni, “Impure altruism 
and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving,” The Economic Journal (1990) 464-
477. 
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nomics could do. Here is a case where standard economics would predict 
that giving would be zero since the financial ROI is below the Charitable 
ROI. But because people care about this cause in their own hearts, or they 
get special esteem from giving, then the warm-glow could be used to justify 
an individual’s gift. This makes it important to understand what kinds of 
things make up the warm-glow and how important they are to donors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Self-Image, Social-Image, and Warm-glow 
A particularly robust finding is that warm-glow is primarily composed 
of two related notions: self-image and social-image. These are a concern for 
how people feel about themselves (Am I a good and moral person?) and 
what people believe others feel about them (Do others see me as a good and 
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Figure 2.  Individual Giving Decisions with Warm-Glow 
Donors care about the returns to the charitable investment, but also about the 
joy they will feel from helping someone in need, from the social esteem they may 
get from others, and from the pride and self-esteem they feel from making a differ-
ence.  We combine these and other sources of joy from the act of being charitable 
as the warm-glow of giving. Charities that may not merit investment just on eco-
nomic terms (Financial ROI exceeds Charitable ROI) can be supported when the 
warm-glow of giving is added (Charitable ROI + Warm-Glow exceeds Financial 
ROI).   
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moral person?). These concerns are felt by everyone. They are natural, and 
perhaps even instinctive. Moreover, when people evaluate themselves or 
others, they tend to judge the actions of themselves and others relative to 
their peers.10 A $20,000 donation from a college professor would be the 
height of generosity, but from a billionaire would be seen as a pittance. So 
comparison groups matter, and have been shown in many cases to influence 
how information about others can have both desired positive effects and 
hazardous negative effects.11 The main conclusion, however, is that people 
have a strong desire to be seen by themselves and by others as a generous 
and altruistic. 
Another well-established component of self-image and social image, 
however, is the opposite of generosity. People seem to take pleasure in hav-
ing a high level of wealth, especially in comparison to their peers. They 
compete, if you will, in the size of their homes, the stylishness of their cars 
and clothes, and the lavishness of their vacations. A high balance in their 
investment account contributes to this image concern. 
Notice that the two image concerns are somewhat in contradiction. If 
you are more generous you are less rich, and vice versa. It would be grand, 
and if one could both feel generous without feeling less rich. 
3. Warm-Glow, Making a Difference and Leaving a Legacy 
Many donors with high incomes have other warm-glow objectives that 
are not in the purview of those of more average incomes. People of means 
often talk of gifts that “make a real difference,” or that leave a legacy. This 
is natural—everyone wants to be remembered for more than having simply 
done their jobs well. 
What does it mean in economic terms to make a difference or to leave 
a legacy? Let’s return to Figure 1 and increasing returns. If there is some 
charitable good or cause that is “stuck at zero” because of increasing re-
turns, one wealthy donor can do a great service by giving enough to surpass 
                                                                                                                           
 10 James Andreoni, & John Karl Scholz. “An econometric analysis of charitable giving with 
interdependent preferences,” Economic inquiry 36.3 (1998) 410-428. 
 11 One example is reporting the gifts of donors in categories, such as the “$1000 to $2000” 
category. Naturally, people assume everyone in this category is giving precisely $1000, which 
become a self-fulfilling expectation. Setting categories optimally is a fine art of fundraisers. See 
William T. Harbaugh, “What do donations buy?: A model of philanthropy based on prestige and 
warm glow,” Journal of Public Economics 67.2 (1998) 269-284; 
William T. Harbaugh, “The prestige motive for making charitable transfers,” American Economic 
Review (1998) 277-282. Another example is the unintended consequence of announcing the cu-
mulative donations to a cause whenever someone made an additional donation. This make the 
large donors give smaller and more frequent amounts, but made the small donors hide by giving 
nothing. See James Andreoni, Matthew Goldman & Marta Maras, “Holier Than Thou? Social 
Effects on Religious Giving,” (Draft, 2015). 
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the threshold, (point B) that makes the good viable. When Bill and Melinda 
Gates first opened their foundation, for instance, their first project was 
providing millions of vaccines to people in the poorest and most remote 
areas of the globe, which was a job that no other government or charity had 
attempted. Because they could give on such a large scale, they were able to 
create great social good. Similar opportunities exist for others at a less 
grand scale, such as donating a wing of a hospital, building an art museum, 
founding a charter school, or giving a named professorship.  
B. Behavioral Economics: Loss-Aversion, Endowment Effect, and Mental 
Accounting, and Present-Bias 
Behavioral economics has uncovered many regularities in behavior 
that have expanded our notions of how people make choices. The important 
ones for DAFs are discussed here. 
1. Loss Aversion 
The primary insight from behavioral economics is that decisions on 
spending depend no on how much people have, but on how  much it chang-
es what people have.  In particular, people set a reference point for evaluat-
ing how they feel about these changes.  This reference point may vary from 
one situation to the next. For stock traders it may be zero gains or losses on 
the day. For people saving for retirement it may be whether their portfolio is 
keeping up with their expectations. For deciding how happy I am with my 
salary, it may matter how it compares to the salary of my closest colleague. 
What makes these reference points interesting is that behavior be-
comes especially sensitive to changes around that reference point. A stock 
trader who is $10,000 down will take more risky positions than one $10,000 
up, even though the quality of new investments does not depend on the in-
vestor’s recent good or bad luck. An individual may be happy with a low 
return on their 401(k) plan when it beats the market but unhappy with the 
same return with it does worse than the market. A $10,000 raise makes me 
happier when that raise is $1000 above my colleague than when it is $1,000 
below my colleague, even though it spends the same either way. This 
asymmetry that people hate losses more than they love gains of similar 
magnitude is called loss aversion, and it is the famous theory attributed to 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and discussed in Kahneman’s best-
selling book, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011). 
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2. The Endowment Effect 
Second is a related notion called the Endowment Effect.12 How much 
would you be willing to pay to acquire a new Tesla? Now suppose I gave 
you a new Tesla and offered to buy it back from you. What price would you 
be willing to accept? Standard economics says that the highest price you 
would pay to buy the object should be about the same as the lowest price 
you would accept to sell the object back. Yet, the difference in these prices 
is often very large, sometimes as high as 50%. The idea here is that before 
you own something it is not in your reference point, so acquiring it is a 
gain.  But once you come to own something (you are endowed with it), it 
enters your reference point and giving it up is a loss. Since you hate losses 
more than you love gain, parting with something that is reduces your happi-
ness more than acquiring that same object increases your happiness.   
3. Mental Accounting 
The third key insight from behavioral economics is called mental ac-
counting. 13  Suppose that you are walking to a restaurant to meet your 
spouse for dinner when you discover a $100 bill blowing down the side-
walk. No one is in sight, and there is no use in trying to find its owner. You 
decide to use the $100 to splurge on a fine wine at dinner, and to leave the 
waiter a big tip. Suppose instead that while you are waiting for your spouse 
at the restaurant you use the time check your investments returns using your 
smart phone. You see that the value of your portfolio went up by a surpris-
ing $10,000 today. Paradoxically, you do not splurge at dinner. Why not? 
Both events were unanticipated gains, and one was 100 times more than the 
other. Shouldn’t the portfolio returns trigger the bigger splurge? The reason 
it doesn’t is that people tend to see money as segregated for different pur-
poses, often depending on how the money was obtained or where the mon-
ey is kept. Inherited money, salary, bonuses, gifts, tax refunds, 401(k) ac-
counts, and found money are often spent in very different ways, even 
though to an economist money is money, regardless of its source. In reality 
people do not see that money is money, but keep it in separate “mental” ac-
counts.  
                                                                                                                           
 12 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The endowment 
effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias,” The journal of economic perspectives (1991) 193-206. 
 13 Richard Thaler, “Mental accounting and consumer choice.” Marketing science 4.3 (1985): 
199-214. 
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4. Present Bias 
Suppose you can buy something you want, get it right away, but pay 
for it tomorrow?  Or suppose you must pay for it today and only receive it 
tomorrow.  Since there is very little difference between these two cases, 
standard economics predicts the number of buyers should be similar.  In 
fact, the difference is large—more people buy when the joy of consuming 
comes before the pain of paying.  
What does this have to do with charities?   In a recent experiment on 
giving, donors were given one of these three options:  1) Give today and 
pay today, 2) commit to giving today but pay for that gift later, or 3) make a 
non-binding pledge today to give money later.14   The finding is that people 
give more when they can pay for the donation later (comparing 2 to 1).  
When they can pledge, they are even more willing to pledge a gift than they 
were to commit to a gift.  However, when time came to actually follow 
through on the pledge, many had changed their mind.  In the study, depend-
ing on other factors, sometimes pledges resulted in more total donations in 
the end, sometimes fewer, but on average donations were the same with 
either pledges or commitments.    
When donors were given the choice to give now or pledge to give lat-
er, most preferred to pledge rather than give now—they valued keeping 
their options open.  Those who were quite certain of making their donations 
later, however, actually preferred to give today.  That is, those who didn’t 
really need the flexibility were the ones who were more willing to give 
away the money immediately.   
From the point of the view of the charity, getting a commitment would 
probably be favored—since on average they could expect about the same 
revenues, a commitment is helpful in that it eliminates the risk that someone 
could give less without foreclosing the chance they could give more.  
5. Applying Behavioral Economics 
Since individuals are largely unaware of the four deviations from ra-
tional-economist behavior just described, behavioral economists thing that, 
rather than try to educate people about how to make better decisions, we 
often be more effects if we think of ways to change the presentation of deci-
sions to help people make “better” ones.  This is the point of the important 
book Nudge, by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2008). We’ve learned, 
for instance,  that “cashing out” Wall Street traders more frequently than 
                                                                                                                           
14 James Andreoni, Ann-Kathrin Koessler, and Marta Serra-Garcia, “Intertemporal Altru-
ism.” Draft 2015. 
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once a day prevents them from “chasing their losses,” and that “opt in by 
default” to 401(k) programs greatly increases participation and locks away 
that money in people’s minds so that, psychologically, it isn’t available for 
splurging. And making tax refunds available in a matter of days rather than 
months makes more people file before the April 15 deadline, thus reducing 
the burden on the IRS. 
So, by working with the behavioral shortcuts that people use naturally, 
we can guide people to make decisions that are better for themselves and 
for society at large. 
C. Behavioral Economics and DAFs 
We begin this with a discussion of mental accounts and what we know 
from research about what happens when the timing of gifts is mismatched 
with the making of those gifts. We will also distinguish between gifts that 
are intended to buy something for others (a donation) as compared to buy-
ing something for one’s self (a legacy). Finally, we will consider the effect 
of commitment inherent in DAFs, and how those differ from “intentions” to 
give without using a DAF.  
 
1. Mental Account: Charity’s Money 
Consider an average person who does not have the means to be con-
cerned with a charitable legacy. If such a person has a substantial capital 
gain and uses that to set up a DAF, they get two windfalls. First is the tax 
savings, and second is the dollars in the DAF. We don’t have the data to 
know how these windfalls fit into mental accounts, but we can speculate 
based on what we do know. 
First, we rely on our prior analysis that tells us that when the policy is 
infra-marginal, then a person can get the full tax benefits of a DAF without 
changing their plans for giving.  This type of person will always open a 
DAF, and will likely use it as a savings account for a year’s worth of giving. 
One might imagine a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (the ninth most popular recipient of DAF contributions from Fidelity 
Charity in 201415) using the DAF account each year for her annual dues to 
the church. For people like this, it is very likely that the DAF is seen in the 
mental account that people count as, in this example, “money for the 
Church.” The DAF money is seen as already spent, and the DAF is allowing 
them to meet their annual obligations, but to do so in a way that saves the 
most tax dollars for the individual. 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Giving Report 2015, 8. 
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2. Mental Account: My Legacy 
Thing get more interesting when we imagine those DAF holders who 
are capable of a major gift. Rather than imagining the gain as 100 thousand 
dollars, perhaps we could imagine the gain to be 100 million dollars. At this 
level of DAF account, the donor is very likely to be looking for more than 
simply paying annual dues to the church, but instead could be looking for a 
legacy contribution. By its nature, legacy is public. It may even carry the 
donor’s name. Now a donor looking at this DAF has an entirely different 
mental account for this money, namely “my legacy account.”  It is far more 
compelling to believe that such an individual may still think of the $100 
million DAF deposit as his or her own money even though intellectually 
they recognize that it is not.  
What if the donor for this or some other reasons continues to see the 
DAF money as being in a mental account that belongs to her? Then there 
are at least three possible effects.  First, a donor will be very deliberate in 
her choice of recipient, since it reflects on the donor as well as helping soci-
ety.  Second, the right investment might well exceed the $100 set aside in 
the DAF, meaning one might need to wait 10 or 15 years until the balance 
grows to large enough to make the desired statement. Since both of these 
effects contribute to delay in giving, these contribute to a loss of social re-
turn, thus lowering the value of the gift.  
 Third, because the DAF money is thought of as hers, it is part of her 
endowment, and therefore is subject to the endowment effect.  That means 
creating the DAF is a gain which they can enjoy as long as it is in “my leg-
acy account.”  When the money leaves the legacy account it neither emo-
tionally or intellectually belongs to the donor.  Thus, spending the DAF 
could be seen as a loss, and if a losses looms larger than gains, once people 
set up a fund that is mentally “my legacy fund” they may become unwilling 
to spend the money and absorb the loss of that fund. 
These three effects all give the donor the incentive to wait before 
spending the money from the DAF. As we argued earlier, what is best for 
society is not that the money grows inside the DAF, but that the money 
grows in society through charitable investments. Even if the only difference 
between the average growth rate in the DAF and in a charitable investment 
is 2% per year, keeping the money in the DAF for 10 years can mean a 20% 
loss to society. 
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3. Intentions versus Commitments 
 When does one get to enjoy the warm-glow of giving when one can 
give to a DAF before giving to a charity?  We said that one can always re-
produce the financial aspects of a DAF without actually having a DAF ac-
count.  Just put investments in account without taxable distributions and 
give the money to a charity when one is ready.   Table 1 showed that such a 
plan actually is a better financial investment than a DAF.  So why use a 
DAF when a “home-made-DAF” is financially superior?  
 The answer might lie in when someone gets the personal and social joy 
from giving.  If a person privately sets up an account with the intention of 
giving the balance in that account to charity in 10 years, there is no social 
reward until donation is given.   And because the decision can always be 
changed, one cannot really feel much joy from giving until the money actu-
ally resides with a charity.  
 Do DAFs change this?  They might.  Since the money donated is ir-
revocable it literally represents how generous one is rather than how gener-
ous one might become.  If that allows people to take more joy now in their 
plan to give in 10 years, then an actual DAF may be an attractive alternative 
to a home-made-DAF.   
 But now we have to ask the question, which DAF is more likely to 
actually be donated in 10 years, the real DAF or the home-made DAF.  
Again, we invoke the endowment effect.  Now the real DAF account enters 
my reference point for how generous I am, and it has been growing nicely 
over 10 years.   The home-made DAF is not in my reference point and to 
show myself and others that I really am generous, I must actually give the 
money to a charity.   Since my actual DAF is already given, I can continue 
to enjoy the warm-glow without actually disbursing it.  
4. Mission-Driven Charities Prefer DAFs 
Nonprofits and community foundations also manage DAF funds.  For 
instance, Stanford University will hold and manage your DAF as long as 
you agree that at least half of the money will be disbursed to Stanford.  
Community Foundations might have similar rules stipulating minimum con-
tributions to the community.   
Imagine a charity or a community foundation that is meeting with a 
prospect to solicit a gift.  They give the donor two options: 1) give us the 
money now and we will use it as best we see over the coming years, or 2) 
put the money in a DAF with us, where most or all of the DAF money is 
committed to our charity, and work with us over the coming years to find 
just the right projects for you to sponsor.   
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Both behavioral economic theory and experimental evidence suggest 
that getting a “yes” from the donor is more likely in option 2.  It is always 
easy to commit today to do something that is potentially far off into the fu-
ture.  And since DAFs are irrevocable, the charity eliminates the risk that 
the donor will change her mind about supporting their cause (at least insofar 
as they require the DAF contribution to go to their charity).  Thus, despite 
any possible delays, the competition for donors and the uncertainty about 
the future make DAFs an attractive resource for charities by locking in dol-
lars, even if it sacrifices control. 
D. Can DAFs be Part of the Solution? 
The behavioral economics tells us that a key variable about DAFs is 
whether some people, such as those saving to create a legacy gift, see the 
DAF as emotionally belonging to them even while intellectually recogniz-
ing that all they own is the control of how it is spent, and not the money 
itself.  If such cases exist, then these donors would be susceptible to the en-
dowment effect:  Seeing the money leave the DAF creates a loss that ex-
ceeds the gain of adding money to the DAF. 
In the discussion of behavioral economics in this paper, I said rather 
than trying to educate people to behave differently, it is often easier to find 
ways to present decisions that work with people’s natural behavioral short-
cuts and help them make the choices that, were they educated, are most 
likely what they would prefer for themselves or for society.  If we think 
there is a problem that some people are holding onto DAF funds because of 
the endowment effect, then we should ask whether we can undo this by 
changing the frame of their decisions. 
The reason the endowment effect might make people unwilling to allo-
cate DAF deposits to charities is that the DAF has entered their reference 
point.  When money leaves the DAF it also leaves the financial statements 
and, as a result, the donor feels a “loss.”  To avoid this loss, the donor may 
procrastinate on making allocations.  
The statement of this problem seems almost to suggest a solution.  
What if when making a grant from the DAF, the donation did not “fall off” 
of the financial reports.  Instead, suppose DAF holders also reported money 
in a third fictitious account labelled, for example, Charitable Investments.   
Figure 3 gives such an example.   In Monthly Statement A, we see $60,000 
leaving the DAF.  Even though it is technically false, this appears to poten-
tially create the visceral feeling of having taken a loss.  
Compare that to Monthly Statement B.  Here the $60,000 allocation is 
simply transferred from one account to the other.  This example does not 
include any calculations of ROI for the charitable investment, but in princi-
58 The Rise of Donor-Advised Funds: Should Congress Respond?  
ple such information could be included.   If, for instance, charities have 
done their due diligence and have an estimate of ROI, then this can be in-
cluded on this statement.  Lacking that, the DAF holder could allow the do-
nor to input their own calculation of ROI based on their research and per-
sonal values.  In this way, donors could see their investment in giving grow 
as well and, if they are growing faster than the DAF investments, the good 
feeling from having given will exceed the potential of a good feeling from 
money remaining invested in financial instruments.  Furthermore, it will 
remind donors that money spent on charity is not simply consumption, but 
has the quality of an investment that can bring returns for many years, and 
sometimes for generations to come.  
CONCLUSION 
The Donor Advised Fund appears to be a simple financial instrument 
that for transitioning wealth into segregated accounts that helps people plan 
their giving, smooth their spending over time, and maximize the tax savings 
offered to charitable gifts, especially gifts of appreciated property.  
Here we have asked what are the public policy impacts of DAFs?  Is 
this a good investment for taxpayers?  They typical analysis of this kind 
offers a simple test:  Do we gain more in extra new charity than we lose in 
extra tax dollars? 
To answer this question we need to know how frequently and by how 
much donors increase giving as a result of DAFs.   For the policy to “break 
even” all of the extra tax savings received by donors would, on average, 
need to be devoted to new giving.   The Fidelity report indicates that 75% of 
DAF holders report giving more because of DAFs.   This, on the one hand, 
is encouraging.   On the other hand, it means that 25% do not increase do-
nations because of the DAFs.   If we assume that they also do not decrease 
donations, but that the tax incentives are infra-marginal here and thus do 
not affect behavior, it means that the 75% now who do increase giving be-
cause of the DAF will (if this 75% is representative of all DAF holders) 
need to increase their donations by 130% of their individual tax savings in 
order to make up for those who do not give more and allow the policy to 
exceed the cost benefit threshold.     
While we can speculate from research done on other sorts of giving 
that this is a relatively high bar to meet, reaching it would not be outside the 
range of estimates of the effects of other inducements to charitable giving.  
What is needed is a detailed analysis of the past and current giving patterns 
by donors, information on the sources of wealth that are contributed to 
DAFs, and the tax consequences of these for the donors. Only then can we 
confirm the claims that DAFs provide a meaningful public policy benefit.   
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Monthly Statement A. 
Statement of Accounts.  September 1 to September 30, 2015
 
Beginning
Balance  Activity 
Ending 
Balance 
Portfolio  1,550,032      
Change in value    +7,760  1,557,782 
Donor Advised Fund   100,000     
Change in Value 
 
Grant to Doctors  
without Borders 
  +520 
 
 
 ‐60,000 
 
 
 
   40,520 
 
Monthly Statement B. 
Statement of Accounts.  September 1 to September 30, 2015
 
Beginning
Balance  Activity 
Ending 
Balance 
Portfolio 
Change in Value 
 
1,550,032   
+7,760 
 
1,557,782 
Donor Advised Fund 
 
Change in Value 
 
Grant to Doctors  
without Borders 
100,000   
 
+520 
 
‐60,000 
 
 
 
 
40,520 
Charitable Investments 
 
Doctors without  
Borders 
           0   
 
 
+60,000 
 
 
 
     60,000 
Figure 3: Can reframing of Financial Statements 
Discourage the Endowment Effect? 
Donors may be discouraged from spending DAF accounts if they see the ac-
count as, at least emotionally, part of their endowment.   A financial statement like 
Panel A above may evoke a visceral feeling of loss.  Panel B, by creating a fictitious 
account called Charitable Investments, allows the money to remain on the financial 
statement after it has been given to a charity.   This now prevents the feeling of a loss 
and may diminish the propensity of donors to fall victim to the endowment effect.  
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Just like the survey conducted by Fidelity on its DAF holders, an invest-
ment house that works closely with a team of economists could craft a sur-
vey that could help shed light on these questions without violating individu-
al confidentiality.  
The second major point made here is that, for reasons unrelated to 
DAFs themselves, behavioral economics would suggest that donors, and 
especially higher income donors, would be predicted to procrastinate on 
granting DAF dollars to charities. Economics teaches us that charitable con-
tributions should really be thought of as charitable investments, since they 
often have returns that can last generations.  As such, it is important both for 
policy evaluation and for economic efficiency that, once a recipient has 
been identified, waiting to fund that recipient is not advancing any econom-
ic goals, and so only social goals must be being pursued by delay.    Such a 
goal could be giving a legacy gift, or other forms of social or personal grati-
fication.   
To help combat delay, one avenue providers of DAFs could test is 
whether financial statements should include a fictitious “charitable invest-
ment account” that keeps track of donations already given.  This then makes 
grants from a DAF appear more like a transfer between the donors’ ac-
counts rather than a deduction from an account.  In this way the donations 
feel emotionally like less of a loss and could be viewed as a gain.   If the 
method were scientifically tested on a sample of donors, and the result was 
to see higher payout rates from the DAFs that have an associated charitable 
investment account, then this would both demonstrate that the endowment 
effect is slowing payout rates, and that a remedy exists that could help both 
donors and society. 
